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ARBITRATION
INTRODUCTION
Enacted in 1925, the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA),' represents a
congressional endorsement of arbitration and, effectively, a codification
of freedom of contract. The Act allows parties to enter into, and to have
enforced, arbitration agreements.2 The FAA "does not affect any contract
that has not the agreement in it to arbitrate, and only asks... the parties
to come in, and carry through, in good faith, what they have agreed to do.
It does nothing more than that."3
The United States Supreme Court has championed this Act of Con-
gress with nearly constitutional regard.! The Court has made clear that
the FAA's broad reach will be given great deference; judicial resistance
to or undermining of arbitral resolution will not be sanctioned.! The exact
extent of the deference to be granted, however, remains somewhat unde-
fined. When the FAA will, or must, yield to another federal statute is an
issue that has been debated since the Act's inception.6
The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit addressed
this issue twice during the survey period,7 reaching different outcomes. In
McWilliams v. Logicon,8 the court found that the Americans with Dis-
abilities Act (ADA)' does not preclude application of the FAA, but in
fact encourages arbitration of disputes.'" In Davister Corp. v. United Re-
public Life Insurance Co.," the court held that the McCarran-Ferguson
Act," which grants power to the states to regulate the business of insur-
ance, preempts the FAA. The Court determined that the public interest of
protecting policyholders outweighed the freedom of contract principle
embodied in the FAA.'3 The incongruent decisions in McWilliams and
1. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14 (1994).
2. See id. at § 2.
3. THOMAS E. CARBONNEAU, ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION: MELTING THE LANCES
AND DISMOUNTING THE STEEDS 141 (1989) (citing 65 CONG. REC. 1931 (1924) (statement of Rep.
Graham)).
4. See id. at 127.
5. See id.
6. See Michael A. Landrum & Dean A. Trongard, Judicial Morphallaxis: Mandatory Arbi-
tration and Statutory Rights, 24 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 345, 360-70 (1998) (outlining the devel-
opment of the Supreme Court's interpretation and application of the FAA to agreements to arbitrate
statutory-based claims).
7. The survey period addresses cases decided by the United States Court of Appeals for the
Tenth Circuit between September 1, 1997, and August 31, 1998.
8. 143 F.3d 573 (10th Cir. 1998).
9. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (1994).
10. See McWilliams, 143 F.3d at 576.
11. 152 F.3d 1277 (10th Cir. 1998).
12. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-1015 (1994).
13. See Davister, 152 F.3d at 1282.
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Davister illustrate the undefined supremacy of the FAA when it is impli-
cated in a claim brought under another federal statute.
Conversely, it is relatively clear when courts will defer the FAA to
state law principles. As a federal statute, the FAA preempts any incon-
sistent state law." The FAA's applicability, however, is dependent on the
existence of a valid agreement to arbitrate which, in turn, is dependent on
state law principles regarding contract formation.'5 Thus, in state law
actions, the courts' role is limited to the determination of whether a valid
arbitration agreement exists and to the enforcement of rendered arbitra-
tion awards. The Tenth Circuit decided two cases during the survey pe-
riod that are consistent with this principle of FAA supremacy in state law
actions. In Avedon Engineering, Inc. v. Seatex,"6 the court limited its re-
view to the arbitrability of the plaintiffs claim. In Miera v. Dairyland
Insurance Co.,"7 the court limited its review to the enforcement of the
rendered arbitration award. These two cases illustrate the recognized role
of state law actions that implicate the FAA.
This survey examines the Tenth Circuit's decisions relating to the
Federal Arbitration Act during the survey period. Part I provides a gen-
eral background on the FAA, including the judicial deference tradition-
ally granted to the Act. Part II discusses the Tenth Circuit's decisions
relating to the FAA's supremacy over other federal statutes. Specifically,
Part U considers the court's decisions involving situations when parties
contractually agree to arbitrate their disputes, subsequently have a dis-
pute arise implicating federal law and, in resolving the dispute, one party
wants to be released from its agreement to arbitrate. Part III reviews the
Tenth Circuit's decisions relating to the applicability of the FAA in ac-
tions brought under state law.
I. BACKGROUND: THE FEDERAL ARBITRATION ACT AND JUDICIAL
DEFERENCE
A. The Federal Arbitration Act and Federal Law
The Federal Arbitration Act ensures the "[vialidity, irrevocability
and enforcement of agreements to arbitrate. ''8 The Supreme Court has
consistently upheld this Act with an almost unbending presumption in
14. See, e.g., Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 272-73 (1995); Southland
Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1984); see also Ellwood F. Oakley, HI & Donald 0. Mayer,
Arbitration of Employment Discrimination Claims and the Challenge of Contemporary Federalism,
47 S.C. L. REv. 475, 497-98 (1996) (noting that while the Southland majority held that the FAA
was substantive federal law, preempting inconsistent state law, the dissent viewed the FAA as pro-
cedural in nature, applying only in federal courts with no preemptive effect). See also infra Part I.B.
15. Cf, Progressive Cas. Ins. Co. v. C.A. Reaseguradora Nacional de Venezuela, 991 F.2d 42,
45-46 (2d Cir. 1993).
16. 126 F.3d 1279 (10th Cir. 1997).
17. 143 F.3d 1337 (10th Cir. 1998).
18. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1994).
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favor of arbitrability. In what has been described as the "arbitration tril-
ogy,"'9 the Court's decisions in Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital v.
Mercury Construction Corp.,'" Southland Corp. v. Keating,2' and Dean
Witter Reynolds Inc. v. Byrd,' firmly hold that the Court will sustain the
fundamental congressional objective embodied in the FAA. In Moses
Cone, the Court established that the FAA provides, as a matter of federal
law, that issues concerning the scope of arbitrability should be resolved
in favor of arbitration. ' In Southland, the Court broadened the scope of
the FAA by holding that, pursuant to the Supremacy Clause of the
United States Constitution, state courts, as well as federal courts, must
apply the substantive law of the FAA:2' "In creating a substantive rule
applicable in state as well as federal courts, Congress intended to fore-
close state legislative attempts to undercut the enforceability of arbitra-
tion agreements."' Dean Witter involved an alleged violation of a federal
statute-the United States Securities Act of 1934.' Upon Byrd's com-
plaint in federal district court arising out of a brokerage agreement con-
taining an arbitration provision, Dean Witter moved the court to compel
arbitration pursuant to the provision.27 In a unanimous opinion, the Court
held that "the Act leaves no place for the exercise of discretion by a dis-
trict court, but instead mandates that district courts shall direct the parties
to proceed to arbitration on issues as to which an arbitration agreement
has been signed."' The Court founded each decision on its sensitivity to
the "fundamental congressional intent to ensure judicial enforcement of
privately made agreements to arbitrate."
The "Court's unbending objective: fostering the unfettered recourse
to arbitration,"' was again evidenced in 1987 in Shearson/American Ex-
press, Inc. v. McMahon.' In this landmark case, the Supreme Court ef-
fectively overruled Wilko v. Swan,3' a case in which the Court had carved
an exception to the FAA's broad applicability. 2 The Wilko Court
19. Linda R. Hirschman, The Second Arbitration Trilogy: The Federalization of Arbitration
Law, 71 VA. L. REV. 1305, 1306-07 (1985).
20. 460 U.S. 1 (1983). In Moses, the Supreme Court held that the court of appeals has the
authority to remand a case to compel arbitration, in order to facilitate Congress's goal of prompt
arbitration. See id. at 29.
21. 465 U.S. 1 (1984). Southland involved a California franchise law which limited certain
types of arbitration. See Southland, 465 U.S. at 3-4.
22. 470 U.S. 213 (1985). The Court held that the district court erred when it refused a motion
to compel arbitration of state claims against a securities broker-dealer. See Moses. Cone., 470 U.S. at
223-24.
23. See Moses Cone, 460 U.S. at 24-25.
24. See Southland, 465 U.S. at 13-16.
25. Id. at 16 (footnotes omitted).
26. See Dean Witter, 470 U.S. at 214.
27. See id. at 214-15.
28. Id. at 218. (emphasis added).
29. ld. at 127.
30. 482 U.S. 220 (1987).
31. 346 U.S. 427 (1953).
32. See Wilko, 346 U.S. at 433-34.
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determined that the arbitration provision at issue in a brokerage contract,
which was regulated by the Securities Act of 1933, 3 violated the public
policy of the Securities Act, rendering the arbitration agreement
unenforceable.' In McMahon, the issue before the court focused on the
arbitrability of claims brought under the Securities Exchange Act of
1934" and the Racketeer Influenced and the Corrupt Organizations Act
(RICO).36 In a 5-4 holding, the Court "further amplifie[dl the already
extensive reach of the emphatic public policy favoring arbitration."M As
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and RICO do not have express lan-
guage barring arbitration, the Court held that the FAA governs, and thus
any claims brought under either act involving a valid arbitration agree-
ment must be arbitrated.' Underlying this decision was again the Court's
seemingly unyielding preference for arbitration when a valid arbitration
agreement exists.
B. The Federal Arbitration Act and State Law
Since its enactment in 1925, the FAA has raised issues of federal-
ism. Enacted during the Swift v. Tyson3 era of federal common law, the
decision in Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins' in 1939 raised the question of
whether the FAA provided procedural or substantive rights.'1 The status
of the FAA, and thus its applicability in diversity suits, was not deter-
mined for nearly thirty years.
In 1967, the Supreme Court, in Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood &
Conklin Manufacturing. Co., 2 held that when a contract involves inter-
state commerce, courts must apply the FAA.' The Court did not directly
address the federalism issue, but effectively decided that issue in its
opinion." Holding that Congress could provide substantive directives to
federal courts in areas where it has authority to act, the Court implicitly
held that the FAA created federal substantive rights-federal substantive
33. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (1994).
34. Wilko, 346 U.S. at 438.
35. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-7811 (1994).
36. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1994); see Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482
U.S. 220,222 (1987).
37. CARBONNEAU, supra note 3, at 126.
38. See McMahon, 482 U.S. at 238, 242.
39. 41 U.S. 1 (1842).
40. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
41. See Erie Railroad, 304 U.S. at 78. The Erie Doctrine, while a murky area of the law, is
interpreted as a prohibition against the application of federal substantive law when state created
substantive rights would be affected. Cf CARBONNEAU, supra note 3, at 141 n.13.
42. 388 U.S. 395 (1967).
43. See Prima Paint, 388 U.S. at 406.
44. Cf. CARBONNEAU, supra note 3, at 109.
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rights that must be applied in federal court.5 The Court's subsequent
decision in Southland made clear that, under the Supremacy Clause, the
state courts must apply the FAA as well. '
The Supreme Court has clearly voiced that the strong policy favoring
the FAA will be honored. A valid arbitration agreement will be enforced
even though the underlying claim may have been resolved differently
under state or federal law. As the decision in McMahon indicates, only
when Congress has expressly banned arbitration of certain disputes will
the policy favoring arbitration yield. '7 The Tenth Circuit during the sur-
vey period primarily followed this precedent. The decisions in Avedon
and Miera are consistent with the supremacy granted the FAA in state
law actions. The court's decision in McWilliams similarly is consistent
with the strong policy favoring arbitration. Davister, however, creates an
exception to the broad applicability of the FAA. Holding that the public
policy of protecting insurance policyholders outweighs the public policy
of promoting arbitration, Davister represents the rare situation when a
court overrules the applicability of the FAA without express congres-
sional direction to do so.
II. CASE DISCUSSION: FEDERAL STATUTES AND THE FEDERAL
ARBITRATION ACT
Congress enacts federal statutory law to protect various public pol-
icy interests: the ADA,8 for example, was enacted to protect disabled
individuals; the McCarran-Ferguson Act 9 was enacted to protect insur-
ance policyholders; the FAA was enacted to protect parties' ability to
agree to arbitrate their disputes. Many interests protected by federal stat-
ute are subject to contractual agreements-agreements in which parties
may agree to arbitrate disputes. The contractual interests protected by the
FAA often seem at odds with those interests protected by other federal
statutes. In arbitration, arbitrators are not required to apply the law.'
Thus, whether a party waives statutory protection by entering an agree-
ment to arbitrate is an issue with which the courts have struggled, and on
which the Supreme Court has remained silent. During the survey period,
the Tenth Circuit decided two cases involving a conflict between a fed-
eral statute and the FAA. In McWilliams v. Logicon,5' the court held that
the public policy interest protected by the ADA did not outweigh, nor
conflict with, the policy of the FAA favoring arbitration. In Davister
45. See id.; see also Prima Paint, 388 U.S. at 424-25 (Black, J., dissenting) (criticizing the
majority for circumventing the "forum shopping" prohibitions under Erie by failing to require that
federal substantive law created under the FAA be applied by state courts).
46. Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 13-16 (1984).
47. Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 226-27 (1987).
48. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (1994).
49. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-1015 (1994).
50. See Landrum & Trongard, supra note 6, at 370-74.
51. 143 F.3d 573 (10th Cir. 1998).
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Corp. v. United Republic Life Insurance Co.,2 the court held that the
public policy of the McCarran-Ferguson Act outweighed the freedom of
contract policy embodied in the FAA. This section examines these two
decisions, provides a comparison of the Tenth Circuit's decisions to
those of other circuits, and analyzes the potential ramifications of the
Tenth Circuit's rulings.
A. Tenth Circuit Decisions
1. McWilliams v. Logicon53
a. Facts
Logicon, Inc. employed McWilliams as a work area controller for
approximately seven years.' McWilliams' employment agreement con-
tained an arbitration agreement stating that "'any controversies, claims,
and/or disputes arising out, of the termination of [his] employment with
[Logicon], shall be settled exclusively through binding arbitra-
tion... pursuant to the Federal Arbitration Act."'"'  Logicon fired
McWilliams in May of 1995.6 In response, McWilliams filed suit in fed-
eral district court claiming that his termination violated the ADA." He
alleged that the company fired him because he suffered from a number of
disabling conditions for which he had requested accommodation." Logi-
con moved to stay litigation pending arbitration and the court granted
this motion in consideration of the employment agreement." The arbi-
trator entered an award in favor of Logicon and the district court af-
firmed.' McWilliams appealed.61
b. Issues Considered
The Tenth Circuit considered three issues: (1) was McWilliams em-
ployed in interstate commerce, and thus within the FAA's exclusionary
language of section 1,' (2) are claims brought under the ADA subject to
binding arbitration in accordance with the FAA, and (3) did Logicon
waive its right to arbitrate by waiting until after McWilliams had filed
suit to move for arbitration.
52. 152 F.3d 1277 (10th Cir. 1998).
53. 143 F.3d 573 (10th Cir. 1998).
54. See McWilliams, 143 F.3d at 574.
55. Id.
56. See id. (quoting the arbitration agreement contained in the employment agreement).
57. See id.
58. See id.
59. See id. at 574-75.
60. See id. at 575.
61. See id.
62. See id.; see also infra note 65 and accompanying text.




Applying a de novo standard of review" to all three issues, the court
first considered whether application of the FAA was precluded by the
exclusionary language of section 1 which states: "nothing herein con-
tained shall apply to contracts of employment of seamen, railroad em-
ployees, or any other class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate
commerce."' Citing to circuits that have construed this exclusion nar-
rowly, the court determined that section 1 excludes only those workers
engaged in the channels of foreign or interstate commerce.' The court
concluded that McWilliams' employment as a "work area controller" did
not directly affect the channels of commerce, and therefore, did not pre-
clude applicability of the FAA under section 1.67
The court then considered whether McWilliams' ADA claim pre-
cluded enforcement of the arbitration agreement." Citing to the strong
federal policy favoring arbitration, the court relied on Gilmer v. Inter-
state/Johnson Lane Corp.,' holding that the presumption in favor of ar-
bitrability exists even when a party's claim is founded upon statutory
rights.' The Tenth Circuit concluded that McWilliams' ADA claim was
arbitrable, finding that the ADA encourages rather than prohibits
arbitration.7'
Finally, the court considered whether Logicon had waived its right
to arbitration by waiting until after McWilliams had filed his complaint
to commence arbitration. The court analyzed the alleged waiver under
Peterson v. Shearson/American Express Inc.," and Metz v. Merrill Lynch,
Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc.,73 which defined factors relevant to a deter-
mination of whether a party has waived its right to enforce an arbitration
agreement. The Peterson/Metz factors assessed by the McWilliams court,
included: (1) were the parties' actions inconsistent with the right to arbi-
trate; (2) were the parties well into preparation for litigation when one
party invoked arbitration; (3) did the party request arbitration near the
trial date; (4) did the defendant seeking arbitration file a counterclaim
without asking for a stay of the proceedings; (5) had intervening steps,
such as taking advantage of judicial discovery, taken place; and (6) had
the delay affected, misled, or prejudiced the opposing party.' In applying
these factors, the court found that Logicon's conduct was not inconsis-
64. See id. (relying on Armijo v. Prudential Ins. Co., 72 F.3d 793, 796 (10th Cir. 1995)).
65. 9 U.S.C. § 1 (1994).
66. See McWilliams, 143 F.3d at 575-76.
67. See id. at 576.
68. See id.
69. 55 U.S. 20(1991).
70. See McWilliams, 143 F.3d at 576 (citing Gilmer, 55 U.S. at 26).
71. See id.; see also 42 U.S.C. § 12212 (1994).
72. 849 F.2d 464, 467-68 (10th Cir. 1988).
73. 39 F.3d 1482, 1489 (1Oth Cir. 1994).
74. See McWilliams, 143 F.3d at 576.
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tent with its right to arbitrate under the employment agreement; the par-
ties were not well into preparation; Logicon had invoked arbitration
shortly after McWilliams filed his claim; McWilliams was not required
to defend against a counterclaim; and Logicon had not abused discovery
or any other judicial procedures that would not have been available in an
arbitral proceeding." The court, therefore, concluded that Logicon had
not waived its right to enforce the arbitration agreement, and it conse-
quently affirmed the lower court's order compelling arbitration.76
d. Analysis
McWilliams represents the general judicial consensus regarding the
applicability and supremacy of the FAA. The FAA will rarely yield to
statutory claims. When a valid arbitration agreement exists, the role of
the judiciary is thus limited to (1) determining the arbitrability of the
parties' dispute, and (2) the subsequent enforcement of the arbitrator's
decision.
2. Davister Corp. v. United Republic Life Insurance Co.'
a. Facts
United Republic Life Insurance Company (United) and Davister
Corporation entered into an agreement whereby United would purchase,
via a stock transfer, R.G. Acquisition Corporation (RGA) from
Davister.8 The deal included a transfer of real property interests in Texas
which constituted RGA's principal assets." The agreement regarding the
property transfer contained an arbitration provision.' Subsequent to this
agreement, the Utah Insurance Commissioner reviewed the transaction
and notified United that the transaction was improper and must be re-
versed.' Before reversal of the transaction was complete, the Utah
Commissioner filed suit in Utah state court seeking control of United.82
The Commissioner then filed suit in Texas state court to gain control of
the real property interest involved in the transaction.8' Davister inter-
vened, seeking to rescind the contract, claiming that the order from the
Commissioner to reverse amounted to a failure of consideration in its
transaction with United. ' In the meantime, the Utah state court issued an
order compelling the liquidation of United and appointing the Commis-
75. See id. at 576-77.
76. See id. at 577.
77. 152 F.3d 1277 (10thCir. 1998).









sioner as liquidator." The Utah state court then ordered a stay of all
claims against United pursuant to Utah statute; the Texas state court
honored the stay." Davister then filed suit in United States District Court
for the District of Utah against the Commissioner, and against United,
seeking to compel arbitration pursuant to the agreement between the par-
ties related to the Texas property interest. 7 The district court refused to
compel arbitration, and Davister appealed."
b. Issue Considered
At issue before the court was whether the FAA must yield to a state
court blanket stay in an insurance liquidation setting-specifically,
"whether state law governing insurance company delinquency proceed-
ings reverse pre-empt the [FAA] under the McCarran-Ferguson Act.""
Davister argued that the national policy favoring arbitration embodied in
the FAA mandated arbitration when the parties have agreed to submit
their dispute to arbitration.' United and the Utah Commissioner argued
that the McCarran-Ferguson Ace1 does not allow any act of Congress to
preempt any state law regarding the regulation of the business of insur-
ance and thus the arbitration provision could not be enforced under the
FAA, but must be assessed under relevant state law.
92
c. Majority Opinion
The McCarran-Ferguson Act provides: "No Act of Congress shall
be construed to invalidate, impair, or supersede any law enacted by any
state for the purpose of regulating the business of insurance ... unless
such Act specifically relates to the business of insurance."'93 Therefore,
the court began its analysis by considering whether the liquidation pro-
ceeding against United fell within the Act's meaning of "the business of
insurance." Relying on United States v. Fabe," the court determined
that a state statute enacted specifically to protect insurance policy holders





89. Id. at 1280 (quoting Munich American Reinsurance Co. v. Crawford, 141 F.3d 585, 587
(5th Cir. 1998)).
90. See id. at 1278.
91. 15 U.S.C. § 1012 (1994). See also infra note 96 and accompanying text.
92. See Davister, 152 F.3d at 1279.
93. 15 U.S.C. § 1012(b) (1994).
94. Davister, 152 F.3d at 1279.
95. 508 U.S. 491 (1993). Fabe provides a three part test to determine what insurance is, and
thus when the McCarran-Ferguson Act should be applied: "(1) does the federal statute at issue 'spe-
cifically relate to the business of insurance;' (2) was the state statute enacted 'for the purpose of
regulating the business of insurance'; (3) would application of the federal statute 'impair, interfere,
or supercede' the state statute." Davister, 152 F.3d at 1279 n.l (quoting Fabe, 508 U.S. at 500-01).
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cates the McCarran-Ferguson Act.' Citing the Fifth Circuit's decision in
Munich American Reinsurance Co. v. Crawford,' the court then held that
the FAA is reverse pre-empted whenever the McCarran-Ferguson Act is
implicated."8
Applying this analysis to the Davister facts, the court concluded that
Utah enacted the statute consolidating claims against a liquidating in-
surer to protect policyholders." Thus, the court held that the McCarran-
Ferguson Act was implicated and application of the FAA was reverse
pre-empted."' The court recognized that the parties had agreed to arbi-
trate disputes arising out of the property transfer agreement; however, it
stated that it would not allow a "putative creditor to pluck from the entire
liquidation proceeding one discrete issue and force arbitration contrary to
the blanket stay entered by the Utah state court.""' Thus, in a liquidation
setting, the FAA will not govern agreements to arbitrate; state law, on the
other hand, will control the transaction pursuant to the McCarran-
Ferguson Act.
d. Dissenting Opinion
In dissent, Judge Lucero argued that the majority opinion adopted
an overly broad interpretation of Fabe and the majority had wrongly
provided an exception to the supremacy of the FAA without the neces-
sary express command from Congress." Stating that Fabe limits the
business of insurance merely to the "protection of policyholders," Judge
Lucero argued that the blanket stay of an arbitral proceeding is a benefit
to all creditors and not specifically a benefit to policyholders." Further,
he asserted that Utah's law does not mandate against arbitration within
the insurance context, and therefore, the FAA should not have been pre-
cluded from its applicability absent express legislative direction."
e. Analysis
The Tenth Circuit made a conspicuous move in holding claims
within the jurisdiction of the McCarran-Ferguson Act immune from the
FAA. To overcome the strong presumption of arbitrability, express con-
gressional language mandating exclusive judicial jurisdiction is usually
required." The Tenth Circuit in Davister carved an exception to the ap-
96. Davister, 152 F.3d at 1281-82.
97. 141 F.3d 585 (5th Cir. 1998).




102. See id. at 1282-83.
103. Id.
104. See id. at 1283.
105. Cf CARBONNEAU, supra note 3, at 130.
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plicability of the FAA when Congress had not expressly mandated a ju-
dicial remedy. The Davister decision, therefore, conflicts with the strong
presumption in favor or arbitration.
The McCarran-Ferguson Act provides that the business of insurance
shall be subject to the laws of the several states.'0 The Act provides that a
private contract between two parties may contain an arbitration clause; it
further declares that state law principles will govern the interpretation of
insurance contracts."° Insurance contracts, however, involve interstate
commerce, thus invoking the applicability of the FAA." Hence, regard-
ing the enforceability of an arbitration agreement, the following issue is
raised: whether the FAA or state law is applicable when an insurance
company becomes insolvent and the agreement provides for arbitration
of disputes arising out of the liquidation.
B. Other Circuits
There is a split on this issue within the circuits, and silence from the
Supreme Court. The Second and Ninth Circuits have held that the
McCarran-Ferguson Act does not preclude application of the FAA. In
Hamilton Life Insurance Co. v. Republic National Life Insurance Co.,m
9
the Second Circuit held that McCarran-Ferguson does not exempt the
business of insurance from other federal statutes unless such compliance
would conflict with state laws regulating insurance."' The court stated
that "[t]he plain and unambiguous statutory language is persuasive evi-
dence that the McCarran-Ferguson Act was not intended to preclude the
application of these federal statutes to insurance unless they invalidate,
impair or supersede applicable State legislation regulating the business of
insurance.""' Holding that state arbitration statutes do not invalidate,
impair, or supersede states' regulation of the business of insurance, but
regulate "the method of handling contract disputes generally," the court
refused to find the FAA reverse pre-empted by operation of New York
law regulating the business of insurance."2
The Ninth Circuit, in Bennett v. Liberty National Fire Insurance
Co.,' 3 held that Montana's insolvency statute does not regulate the busi-
106. See 15 U.S.C. § 1012(a) (1994).
107. Cf, Willy E. Rice, Federal Courts and the Regulation of the Insurance Industry: An Em-
pirical and Historical Analysis of Courts' Ineffectual Attempts to Harmonize Federal Antitrust,
Arbitration, and Insolvency Statutes with the McCarran-Ferguson Act-1941-1943,43 CATH. U. L.
REv. 399, 432-33 (1994) (arguing that the McCarran-Ferguson Act should be eliminated and a
federal regulation of insurance put in place).
108. See id.
109. 408 F.2d 606 (2d Cir. 1969).
110. See Hamilton, 408 F.2d at 611.
Ill. Id; see also 15 U.S.C. § 1012(b) (1994).
112. Hamilton, 408 F.2d at 611. The court referred to the Texas Arbitration Act and the New
York Arbitration Act specifically in determining that state law relating to arbitration did not operate
to regulate the business of insurance. See id.
113. 968 F.2d 969 (9th Cir. 1992).
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ness of insurance and, therefore, does not preclude applicability of the
FAA."' The court rested its decision on its determination that the liqui-
dator-plaintiff sought to enforce rights primarily derived from the insol-
vent insurer's contract rather than from Montana's insolvency
regulation."' The court held that because the underlying dispute between
the parties was one of contract, and not one of insurance policyholders'
rights, the parties were compelled to arbitrate their dispute pursuant to
the FAA."'6 In its decision, the court rejected the argument that the public
policy interest furthered by the regulation of insolvent insurers should
outweigh the federal interest in compelling arbitration under the FAA."7
Finding no harm to the liquidator, but merely an alternative forum for
resolution, the court rejected the reverse preemption effect of the McCar-
ran-Ferguson Act.'
The Tenth Circuit, with its decision in Davister, joined the Fifth and
Sixth Circuits in finding that state statutes regulating liquidation are pro-
tected from federal preemption by the Federal Arbitration Act."9 The
Fifth Circuit in Munich,'"' imposed a per se rule of reverse preemption
denying the enforceability of any arbitration agreement in insolvency
proceedings.' The Sixth Circuit, in Fabe v. United States Department of
Treasury,'" held that Ohio's liquidation statute "protecte[d] the interests
of the insured" and "regulate[d] the 'business of insurance,"' and was
thus protected from federal preemption.'" Accepting certiorari on Fabe,
the Supreme Court failed to define the relationship between the McCar-
ran-Ferguson Act and the FAA.'"' The Court reversed the Sixth Circuit's
decision, but only on the grounds that "to the extent that [the Ohio prior-
ity statute at issue] is designed to further the interests of other credi-
tors ... it is not a law enacted for the purpose of regulating the business
of insurance."' '
This lack of direction from the Supreme Court has led to a split in the
circuits on the question of whether the FAA applies to insurance contracts.
The Tenth Circuit's decision marks a rare instance where other public
policy concerns outweigh the presumption favoring arbitrability. Davister
further marks the rare instance where the presumption favoring arbitrabil-
ity is overcome, not by a congressional command, but by judicial directive.
114. See Bennett, 968 F.2d at 972-73.




119. Cf. Rice, supra note 107, at 438-39.
120. 141 F.3d 585 (5th Cir. 1998); see also infra notes 97-99 and accompanying text.
121. See Munich, 141 F.3d at 595-96.
122. 939 F.2d 341 (6th Cir. 1991).
123. Fabe, 939 F.2d at 350-51.
124. See United States v. Fabe, 508 U.S. 491,508 (1993).
125. Fabe, 508 U.S. at 508.
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III. CASE DISCUSSION: STATE COMMON LAW AND THE FEDERAL
ARBITRATION ACT
A. Tenth Circuit Cases
1. Avedon Engineering, Inc. v. Seatex'2
a. Facts
Twist, a manufacturing company that designs and produces clothing
and accessories for snowboarding, is the assignor of Avedon Engineer-
ing, a Colorado corporation."v Twist began using textiles produced by
Defendant Seatex, a New York-based division of Balson-Hercules, a
Rhode Island corporation." In preliminary dealings with Seatex, Twist
negotiated quantity, price, and quality standards through telephone and
facsimile communications. Twist then ordered Seatex products and, in
response, Seatex sent Twist its standard sales confirmation forms.'
At the bottom of the forms, special conditions appeared in small
type, including a condition giving notice regarding arbitral resolution of
disputes arising out of the transaction."' The back of the form contained
two clauses relating to arbitration: one stating that disputes arising out of
the transactions would be settled by arbitration; the other that any future
transactions would be controlled by the terms of the sales confirmation
form, unless superseded by a signed contract. "' These terms were not
negotiated by the parties, but were inserted unilaterally by Seatex
through use of a standard form. "3 Twist received and paid for the goods
ordered, but did not sign or return the sales confirmation forms.M
The dispute between the parties arose when Twist ordered water-
proof fabric from Seatex, which subsequently peeled. "' Consumers re-
turned clothing made with this fabric to Twist." After unsuccessfully
trying to resolve the problem with Seatex, Twist sued in Colorado state
court . 3 After removal to federal court on diversity basis, Seatex asserted
that the arbitration clause became part of the contract pursuant to section
2-207 of the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC)."8
126. 126 F.3d 1279 (10th Cir. 1997).
127. See Avedon, 126 F.3d at 1281 & n.2.
128. See id. at 1281.
129. See id.
130. See id.
131. See id. at 1281& n.3.
132. See id. at 1281 & n.4.





138. See infra note 149 and accompanying text.
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Twist argued that section 2-207 prohibited inclusion of the arbitra-
tion term because it would materially alter the contract.'39 The district
court disagreed, holding that the arbitration clause did not materially
alter the contract, and thus it granted Seatex's motion for a stay of litiga-
tion pending arbitration." Six months passed, and Seatex moved for
summary judgment for Twist's failure to timely arbitrate."' The court
held that according to the contract, Twist was bound to initiate arbitration
proceedings within one year of breach. 24 Twist had failed to do so, and
the court thus granted Seatex's motion for summary judgment.' 3
b. Issues Considered
At issue before the Tenth Circuit was whether the parties had agreed
to arbitrate the dispute and whether insertion of the terms materially al-
tered the contract.'" An ancillary, but ultimately dispositive, issue before
the court was whether New York or Colorado law governed the contract."
c. Decision
The court applied a de novo standard of review to both the district
court's grant of the motion to compel arbitration and its denial of a jury
trial on the issue of whether the parties had agreed to arbitrate the
dispute." Pursuant to the FAA, before compelling arbitration, the court
first looked for an agreement to arbitrate."7 The court held that section 2-
207 of the UCC controlled the determination of the existence of an
arbitration agreement.'"4 Section 2-207 provides that unilaterally inserted
terms become part of the contract unless (1) an offer is made expressly
conditional to its terms, (2) additional terms are expressly objected to, or
(3) the term materially alters the contract."9
The court assessed the agreement pursuant to section 2-207, finding
Twist had neither limited its acceptance of any of the offers to their terms
nor expressly objected to them in the preliminary sales confirmation
forms."' Consequently, whether the unilaterally inserted term had become
part of the contract depended on whether the term materially altered the
contract.





144. See id. at 1283.
145. Cf id. at 1284.
146. See id. at 1283.
147. See id. (referring to 9 U.S.C. §§ 3,4 (1994)).
148. See id.
149. See id. at 1283 n.8 (quoting U.C.C. § 2-207 (1994)).
150. See id. at 1283-84.
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Whether the inserted term regarding arbitration materially altered
the contract depended upon which state's law governed the contract."'
The difference in state law would affect two issues: the materiality of the
arbitration clause and the one year limitation on the arbitration clause."
Colorado had not addressed the issue of the materiality of an arbi-
tration clause; thus, the court assumed that Colorado would apply "a
conventional UCC analysis."'' 3 Under this analysis, the burden of show-
ing that arbitration is a material alteration is on the party opposing its
inclusion.' Conversely, New York presumes that arbitration is material
and, thus, that it will not become part of the contract unless the parties
expressly agree to it."'
Colorado had not adopted the general UCC provision permitting
parties to contractually reduce their limitations period.' Under Colorado
law, parties may not agree to reduce the time allowed to bring a claim to
something less than the statute of'limitations.'57 Thus, in Colorado the
limitation on the time allowed to commence arbitration would be a mate-
rial alteration to the contract. Conversely, New York has adopted the
general UCC provision permitting parties to contractually agree to alter
the limitations period to a minimum of one year."' Therefore, under New
York law, the one-year limitation period would not materially alter the
contract, as it would be a reasonably expected term of the agreement.""
Seatex argued that New York's law finding the arbitration clause a
material alteration to the contract would always bar inclusion of an arbi-
tration clause and that the FAA prohibits such a bar."w The court, how-
ever, held that the FAA does not preempt New York's interpretation of
section 2-207."6' The court noted that the existence of an arbitration
agreement must be established before the FAA is invoked, because the
FAA enforces private agreements to arbitrate and does not force parties
to arbitrate when they had not agreed to do so.' 2 State law governs
whether an arbitration agreement exists. Consequently, the FAA will not
preempt New York's interpretation of the materiality of arbitration
agreements within the context of UCC section 2-207 in determining the
validity of an agreement to arbitrate.'63




155. See id. at 1285.
156. See id. at 1286 (citing COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 4-2-725 (West 1992)).
157. See id. (citing COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 4-2-725(1)).
158. See id. at 1285 (citing N.Y. U.C.C. LAW § 2-725(1) (McKinney 1997)).
159. See id.
160. See id. at 1286.
161. See id.
162. See id. at 1286-87.
163. See id. at 1287.
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As the district court did not examine the choice of law issue, and
since that issue would be determinative of whether an arbitration agree-
ment existed, the Tenth Circuit remanded the case to the district court for
determination of the choice of law issue.IM
d. Analysis
The arbitrability of a dispute is an issue firmly within the jurisdic-
tion of the courts." This threshold issue, as the Avedon court held, must
be determined pursuant to state contract law principles. As the Tenth
Circuit did in Avedon, courts may consider whether parties actually
agreed to arbitrate; indeed, arbitration is a creature of contract and, thus,
can only be manifest by party agreement.' By limiting review to the
validity of the arbitration agreement, courts grant deference to the Fed-
eral Arbitration Act, a posture that recognizes and respects the strong
presumption in favor of arbitration because of its underlying principle of
freedom of contract.
2. Miera v. Dairyland Insurance Co.'6
a. Facts
Renetta Miera was injured in New Mexico in an automobile colli-
sion with an uninsured motorist on April 17, 1994." Miera's insurer was
Dairyland Insurance. Dairyland provided Miera with uninsured motorist
protection as well as medical and collision coverage.'" Following the
accident, Miera submitted a claim to Dairyland, upon which the company
paid $5,137.50 to the lienholder on Miera's vehicle and $1,134.91 to
Miera for medical expenses." Unable to resolve further personal injury
and property loss claims by Miera, the parties submitted the issue to ar-
bitration . 7' Arbitrators determined Miera's total loss as $17,134.91.' 7
Dairyland then paid Miera $10,862.50, the difference between the
amount previously paid and the amount awarded by the arbitrators."
Miera filed suit in New Mexico state court to confirm the arbitration
award and to seek further relief under New Mexico's Unfair Trade Prac-
164. See id. at 1288.
165. It is well recognized that whether an issue arbitrable may be decided by a court on contract
law principles. This is true even if the agreement to arbitrate requires arbitral resolution of "all
disputes between the parties," common language in arbitration agreements.
166. Cf First Options v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 945 (1995).
167. 143 F.3d 1337 (10th Cir. 1998).
168. See Miera, 143 F.3d at 1338.
169. See id.
170. See id.
171. See id. at 1338-39.




tices Act and Unfair Claims Practices Act.'" Dairyland removed the suit
to federal court based upon diversity jurisdiction.'" Finding jurisdiction,
the district court granted Dairlyand's motion for summary judgment on
Miera's statutory claims.'76
b. Issue Considered
Specifically before the court was the issue of whether, under New
Mexico law, an insurer can offset amounts previously paid to a
policyholder against an arbitration award of uninsured motorist damages
in the same policy.'"
c. Decision
In rendering its decision, the court first stated that arbitration is a
creation of contract and that parties agree to the scope of arbitration.'78
The court then referred to Quinones v. Pennsylvania General Insurance
Co., W in which the plaintiff had been injured in an uninsured motorist
collision.'" While the jury awarded the plaintiff $25,000, the court did
not instruct it on the collateral source rule, which would have allowed the
plaintiff to recover past medical expenses although the insurer had al-
ready paid those claims under a separate clause in the insurance agree-
ment."' The Quinones court founded its decision on public policy con-
cerns that "[n]o policy would be served by requiring Penn General [the
insurer] to twice pay.., past medical expenses. '82
The court found in Miera that the parties had agreed to the scope of
arbitration.'83 Arbitrable issues were limited to the total amount of dam-
ages due, reserving the legal question of offset to later resolution.'"
Concluding that Quinones was controlling, the court held that Dairyland
had paid medical and property loss bills of over $6,000 prior to arbitra-
tion.' The arbitration award specified that $1,134.91 represented reim-
bursement for necessary medical care.'" Dairyland had paid this amount
to the plaintiff for medical care.'87 The arbitrators had awarded
174. See id. (referring to Unfair Claim Practices Act, N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 59A-1 6-20 to -30
(Michie 1978); Unfair Trade Practices Act, N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 57-12-2 to -10 (Michie 1978)).
175. See id.
176. See id.
177. See id. at 1341.
178. See id.
179. See id. at 1341-42 (referring to Quinones v. Pennsylvania Gen. Ins. Co., 804 F.2d 1167
(10th Cir. 1986)).
180. See Quinones, 804 F.2d at 1169.
181. See id.
182. Id. at 117-1.
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$17,134.91 in total damages. Pursuant to Quinones, the court held that
the insurer may offset amounts previously paid from the payment
awarded under an uninsured motorist claim." Consequently, the court
determined that Dairyland had paid all damages owed to Renatta Miera.
d. Analysis
The FAA provides for judicial enforcement of arbitration awards.'"
In Miera, the Tenth Circuit did not review the merits of the award; the
court merely determined the logistics of enforcing the rendered arbitral
award. This power does not conflict with the FAA and, in fact, provides
more evidence of its recognized supremacy. The limitation on judicial
review ensures the integrity of the arbitral process and the respect for
parties' freedom of contract.
CONCLUSION
State law review of arbitration issues is limited to determinations of
whether valid arbitration agreements exist, and to enforcement of ren-
dered arbitration awards. The Tenth Circuit cases Miera and Avedon
conform with this well-recognized relationship. As these decisions illus-
trate, the role of state law in a claim implicating the FAA is well defined.
The relationship between the FAA and other federal statutes is not as
well defined. Federal statutory claims subject to arbitration agreements are
often challenged. The courts traditionally refuse to preempt the FAA un-
less Congress expressly provides that arbitration is not an available forum
for dispute resolution of the claim. The Tenth Circuit followed this line of
reasoning in McWilliams, holding that a claim brought under the ADA did
not prevent the application of the FAA. The Tenth Circuit, however, carved
a rare exception. Where Congress has not provided a mandate against ar-
bitration, and where the Supreme Court has failed to clarify the relation-
ship between the McCarran-Ferguson Act and the FAA, the Tenth Circuit
forced the FAA to yield. Davister effectively allows state insurance law to
preempt the FAA. Arbitration clauses in insurance contracts will only be
valid and enforceable if they satisfy state laws regarding the arbitrability of
insurance disputes. The Davister court concluded that the public policy of
protecting the insured outweighs the public policy of protecting freedom of
contract. Davister thus undermines the FAA and illustrates the undefined
relationship between the FAA and other federal statutes.
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